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Abstract
Equilibrium properties of Cournot and Stackelberg duopoly are compared with respect to
outputs, proﬁts, and welfare, the results of which depend on some conditions expressed in
terms of the elasticities of the cost and demand functions. In particular, the case where the
condition owing to Fisher (1961), Hahn (1962), and Okuguchi (1964, 1976, 1999) is not
satisﬁed exactly corresponds to the case where the marginal revenue curve is steeper than the
demand curve, the marginal cost curve is decreasing, and the demand curve is elastic to some
extent, the case of which gives rise to diﬀerent results from Okuguchi's (1999).
Key words: Cournot and Stackelberg duopoly, the elasticities of the cost and demand functions,
Fisher-Hahn-Okuguchi condition
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I. Introduction
In a sequential game with two identical players, Gal-Or (1985) explored the conditions on
which a ﬁrst mover (a leader) or a second mover (a follower) gains a higher proﬁt than the
other and showed that the ﬁrst-mover or second-mover advantage over the rival arises if the
reaction function of the follower is downward or upward sloping, respectively.
Okuguchi (1999) compared Cournot duopoly (a simultaneous-mover game) and
Stackelberg duopoly (a sequential-mover game) with respect to outputs and proﬁts and showed
the results as follows. First, if the followerʼs reaction function is downward sloping, then the
outputs and the proﬁts are the largest in the (Stackelberg) leader case, the second largest in the
Cournot case, and the smallest in the (Stackelberg) follower case. Second, if the followerʼs
reaction function is upward sloping, then the outputs are the largest in the Cournot case, the
second largest in the follower case, and the smallest in the leader case, whereas the proﬁts are
the largest in the follower case, the second largest in the leader case, and the smallest in the
Cournot case.
Fisher (1961), Hahn (1962), and Okuguchi (1964, 1976, 1999) assumed that (1) for each
ﬁrm, the marginal cost should rise more rapidly than the marginal revenue, with other ﬁrms
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expanding their ʻcollectiveʼ output, and that (2) for each ﬁrm, the marginal cost should not fall
more rapidly than the demand for total industry output. The ﬁrst assumption was given as a
suﬃcient condition for each ﬁrm to maximize the proﬁt with respect to its output, which is
known as the second-order condition for the optimum. The second assumption was given as a
condition for the Cournot equilibrium to be stable, which we call Fisher-Hahn-Okuguchi
condition.
In this paper we compare equilibrium properties of Cournot and Stackelberg duopoly with
respect to outputs, proﬁts, and welfare, also examining the case where F-H-O condition is not
satisﬁed whereas the second-order condition for the optimum is still satisﬁed, the case of which
Okuguchi (1999) did not examine. In order to deal simultaneously with conditions on whether
the followerʼs reaction function is downward or upward sloping and those on whether F-H-O
condition is satisﬁed or not, given the second-order condition for the optimum, we express
these conditions in terms of the elasticities of the cost and demand functions.
We show that the results of comparison with respect to outputs and proﬁts are diﬀerent
from Okuguchiʼs (1999) in the case where F-H-O condition is not satisﬁed whereas the second-
order condition for the optimum is still satisﬁed. That is, the output is the largest in the
follower case, the second largest in the Cournot case, and the smallest in the leader case, even
if the followerʼs reaction function is downward sloping, whereas the proﬁt is the largest in the
Cournot case.
As for consumer surplus, the results of comparison are summarized as follows. Consumer
surplus is larger in the Cournot equilibrium than in the Stackelberg equilibrium if the followerʼs
reaction function is upward sloping and not so steep. On the contrary, consumer surplus is
smaller in the Cournot equilibrium if the followerʼs reaction function is downward sloping, or if
the followerʼs reaction function is upward sloping and so steep.
As for producer surplus, the results of comparison are summarized as follows. Producer
surplus is larger in the Cournot equilibrium than in the Stackelberg equilibrium if (1) the
marginal revenue function is steeper than the demand function, the marginal cost functions are
non-decreasing, and the demand function is weakly convex and less elastic, or if (2) the
marginal revenue function is steeper than the demand function, the marginal cost functions are
decreasing, and the demand function is weakly convex and elastic to some extent, with some
additional condition for the outputs. On the contrary, producer surplus is smaller in the Cournot
equilibrium if (3) the demand function is steeper than the marginal revenue function, the
marginal cost functions are non-decreasing, and the demand function is convex to some extent
and less elastic, if (4) the demand function is steeper than the marginal revenue function, the
marginal cost functions are decreasing, and the demand function is convex to some extent and
elastic to some extent, or if (5) the marginal cost functions are steeper than the marginal
revenue function, the marginal cost functions are non-decreasing, and the demand function is
strongly convex and more elastic.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we formulate basic
models of Cournot and Stackelberg duopoly. In Section III we compare equilibrium properties
of Cournot and Stackelberg duopoly with respect to outputs, proﬁts, and welfare, i.e., consumer
surplus, producer surplus, and total surplus (deﬁned as the sum of consumer surplus and
producer surplus). We attempt to classify the results of comparison by some conditions on the
slope of the followerʼs reaction function expressed in terms of the elasticities of the cost and
demand functions. In Section IV we provide concluding remarks.
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II. Basic Models
We assume that there are two ﬁrms, labeled 1, 2 respectively, in an industry, each of
which produces xi (i=1, 2) units of homogenous commodities to be sold in a single market; all
the outputs are non-negative, i.e., xiB0, i=1, 2. Denote by X=x1+x2 the total output in the
industry.
Let p=P(X) be the (inverse) demand, where p is the market price of the good. We assume
that the function P (X) is continuous, twice diﬀerentiable, and monotonically decreasing. We
also assume that 0CxiCM, i=1, 2, such that P(X)=0 if X=x1+x2BM for some M>0.
Let Ci (xi) be the (total) cost function of ﬁrm i that produces xi units of the output. We
assume that the function Ci (xi) is continuous, twice diﬀerentiable, and monotonically non-
decreasing.
The proﬁt of ﬁrm i is written in the form p i(xi, xj)=xiP(X),Ci(xi), i, j=1, 2, j4i. In
order to guarantee the non-negative proﬁt, we may assume that Ci(0)=0 for all i.
1
Note that
since P(X) and Ci(xi) are continuous and twice diﬀerentiable by assumption, so is p i(xi, xj).
Firm i maximizes the proﬁt p i(xi, xj)=xiP(X),Ci(xi) with respect to the output xi . The
ﬁrst-order condition for the optimum for ﬁrm i is given by
P(j i(xj)+xj)+j i(xj)P'(j i(xj)+xj),Ci'(j i(xj))=0, (1)
where j i(xj)=x
C
i is the reaction function of ﬁrm i. One could show the following properties of
the function j i, which we use hereafter:
2
(i) j i is continuous.
(ii) j i is diﬀerentiable in an open neighborhood of xCj .
A point (xC1 , x
C
2) at which the curves j1 and j2 cross with each other deﬁnes the Cournot
duopoly equilibrium. In order to guarantee that the solution xCi of equation (1) uniquely exists,
we assume that p i is strictly concave, namely:
Condition 1. 2p i/x
2
i=(P'+xiP")+(P',Ci")<0 at x
C
i for i=1, 2.
Given Condition 1, the second-order condition for the optimum is satisﬁed. Throughout the
paper we assume that Condition 1 is always satisﬁed.
Diﬀerentiating (1) with respect to xj and arranging terms, we have
j i'(xj)=,(
2p i/xjxi)/(
2p i/x
2
i )=,(P'+xiP")/{(P'+xiP")+(P',Ci")}, (2)
which gives the slope of the reaction curve of ﬁrm i. From (2) we see that, given Condition 1,
j i'<0 (resp. >0) as 
2p i/xjxi=P'+xiP"<0 (resp. >0), that is, quantities of the outputs are
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1 As for this point, see Okuguchi (1976).
2 Let U be open in R2 and let p i/xi: U  R be continuous and diﬀerentiable. Let (xCi , xCj )  U, that is, U is an
open neighborhood of a point (xCi , x
C
j ), and assume that p i (x
C
i , x
C
j ) /xi=0 but p j (x
C
i , x
C
j ) /xj40. By the Implicit
Function Theorem we observe that there exist an open neighborhood U'of xCj and a continuous and diﬀerentiable
function j i: U' R such that j i(x
C
j )=x
C
i and p i(j i(xj), xj)/xi=0 for all xj  U'. Okuguchi (1976) proved that the
followerʼs reaction function is continuous, focusing on the property that a real-valued and strictly concave function on a
set in R2 has a unique (global) maximum. As for the proof, see Takayama (1986).
strategic substitutes (resp. complements).
The following is what we call Fisher-Hahn-Okuguchi condition:
Condition 2. P',Ci"<0 at x
C
i for i=1, 2.
Note that Condition 2 is equivalent to saying that |2p i/x
2
i |>|
2p i/xjxi| at x
C
i for i, j=1,
2, j4i. F-H-O condition means that for each ﬁrm, the marginal cost should not fall more
rapidly than the demand for total industry output.
3
It follows that at xCi for i=1, 2,
P'+xiP"=(P/Xe)(1+s i/h)<0 (resp. >0) as 1+s i/h>0 (resp. <0),
P',Ci"=(P/Xe){1,m i(1+e)/s i}<0 (resp. >0) as ,m i+s i>(resp. <) m ie, (3)
(P'+xiP")+(P',Ci")=(P/Xe){2+s i/h,m i(1+e)/s i}<0 as ,m i+s i(2+s i/h)>m ie,
where s i=xi/X with 0<s i<1 represents the ratio of the size of ﬁrm iʼs production to the total
production of the good, i.e., the market share of ﬁrm iʼs products; e=P/XP'with e<,1 by (1),
h=P'/XP"with hB0 (resp. <0) as P"C0 (resp. >0), and m i=xiCi"/Ci' with m iB(resp. <) 0
as Ci"B0 (resp. <0) represent the elasticity of the demand function, the elasticity of the slope
of the demand function, and the elasticities of the marginal cost functions, respectively.
4
Using
the terminology in Brander and Spencer (1984), we may say that h and m i measure the “relative
curvature” of P and that of Ci at x
C
i , respectively. Since
,1+s i/m iB(resp. <) ,1 as m iB0 (resp. <0),
,1+(s i/m i)(2+s i/h)B(resp. <) ,1+s i/m i as m i(1+s i/h)B(resp. <) 0, (4)
,1+(s i/m i)(2+s i/h)B(resp. <) ,1 as m i(2+s i/h)B(resp. <) 0,
we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1. In any of the following cases, Condition 1 is satisﬁed:
(a) We have P'+xiP"<0 and P',Ci"<0 if and only if
(i) s i/h>,1, m iB0, and e<,1, or (ii) s i/h>,1, m i<0, and ,1+s i/m i<e<,1.
(b) We have P'+xiP">0 and P',Ci"<0 if and only if
(i) ,2<s i/h<,1, m iB0, and e<,1, (ii) ,2<s i/h<,1, m i<0, and ,1+(s i/m i)(2+
s i/h)<e<,1, or (iii) s i/h<,2, m iB0, and e<,1+(s i/m i)(2+s i/h).
(c) We have P'+xiP"<0 and P',Ci">0 if and only if s i/h>,1, m i<0, and ,1+(s i/m i)(2+
s i/h)<e<,1+s i/m i.
Note that Case (a) and Case (b) in Lemma 1 correspond to the case where Condition 1
and Condition 2 are satisﬁed and Case (c) corresponds to the case where Condition 2 is not
satisﬁed whereas Condition 1 is still satisﬁed. Also note that ,1<j i'<0 in Case (a), j i'>0
in Case (b), and j i '<,1 in Case (c) . Thus the slope of ﬁrm iʼs reaction function has been
expressed by the elasticities of the demand function and the market share of ﬁrm iʼs products.
In other words, strategic substitution/complementarity is regarded as a consequence, not as an
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3 The Cournot (oligopoly or duopoly) equilibrium may be unstable even if F-H-O condition is satisﬁed. As for this
point, see Seade (1980), Al-Nowaihi and Levine (1985), and Chuman (2008, 2009).
4 In particular, the equality of the second of the three equations in (3) can be derived as follows: Since P(1+1/e)=
Ci ' by (1), expressing that for ﬁrm i the marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost at x
C
i , we have P',Ci "=
(P/X){(XP´/P),(X/xi)(xiCi"/Ci')(Ci'/P)}=(P/Xe){1,m i(1+e)/s i}, using Ci'/P=1+1/e.
assumption often appeared in the industrial organization literature.
5
Remark. Let s1=s2=1/2 and m1=m2=m in Lemma 1. Then by (3) we can check that:
(a) ,1<j2'<0 if and only if (i) hB0 orC,1/2, mB0, and e<,1, or (ii) hB0 orC,1/2,
m<0, and ,1+1/2m<e<,1;
(b) 0<j2'<1 if and only if (i) mB0, ,1/2<h<,1/3, and e<,1, (ii) mB0,
,1/3<h<,1/4, and e<,1+(1/m)(3/2+1/2h), (iii) mB0, ,1/4<h<0, and e<,1+
(1/m) (3/2+1/2h), or (iv) m<0, ,1/2<h<,1/3, and ,1+ (1/m) (3/2+1/2h)<e<,1;
j2'>1 if and only if (v) mB0, ,1/3<h<,1/4, and ,1+ (1/m) (3/2+1/2h)<e<,1,
(vi) mB0, ,1/4<h<0, and ,1+(1/m)(3/2+1/2h)<e<,1+(1/m)(1+1/4h), (vii) m<0,
,1/2<h<,1/3, and ,1+ (1/m) (1+1/4h)<e<,1+ (1/m) (3/2+1/2h), or (viii) m<0,
,1/3<h<,1/4, and ,1+(1/m)(1+1/4h)<e<,1;
(c) j2'<,1 if and only if hB0 orC,1/2, m<0, and ,1+(1/m)(1+1/4h)<e<,1+1/2m.
In addition, we can check that conditions (b)(i)(ii)(v) correspond to Case (b)(i) in Lemma 1,
conditions (b)(iv)(vii)(viii) correspond to Case (b)(ii) in Lemma 1, and conditions (b)(iii)(vi)
correspond to Case (b)(iii) in Lemma 1.
Further note that s i/h>,1, corresponding to the case where the demand function is not
too convex, is equivalent to that |2P'+xiP"|>|P'|, that is, the marginal revenue function is
steeper than the demand function; ,2<s i /h<,1 is equivalent to that |2P'+xiP"|<|P'|,
that is, the demand function is steeper than the marginal revenue function; s i /h<,2,
corresponding to the case where the demand function is too convex, is equivalent to that
0<2P'+xiP"<Ci", that is, the marginal cost functions are strictly increasing and steeper than
the marginal revenue function.
In summary, Case (a) in Lemma 1 occurs if (i) the marginal revenue function is steeper
than the demand function, the marginal cost functions are non-decreasing, and the demand
function is less elastic, or if (ii) the marginal revenue function is steeper than the demand
function, the marginal cost functions are decreasing, and the demand function is elastic to some
extent; Case (b) occurs if (i) the demand function is steeper than the marginal revenue function,
the marginal cost functions are non-decreasing, and the demand function is less elastic, if (ii)
the demand function is steeper than the marginal revenue function, the marginal cost functions
are decreasing, and the demand function is elastic to some extent, or if (iii) the marginal cost
functions are steeper than the marginal revenue function, the marginal cost functions are non-
decreasing, and the demand function is more elastic; Case (c) occurs if the marginal revenue
function is steeper than the demand function, the marginal cost functions are decreasing, and
the demand function is elastic to some extent.
Hereafter we focus on the case where all ﬁrms are identical, i.e., Ci (xi)=C (xi), i=1, 2.
Denote the total output and ﬁrm iʼs proﬁt in the Cournot duopoly equilibrium by XC, where XC
= xC1 + x
C
2 , and p
C
i , respectively. Since all ﬁrms compete in the same product market and
produce with the identical cost functions by hypothesis, we have xC1 = x
C
2 and p
C
1 = p
C
2 .
Immediately, s1=s2=1/2 and m1=m2=m (constant).
Let us explore the Stackelberg duopoly. Let ﬁrm 1 be the leader and ﬁrm 2 the follower.
Firm 2, taking ﬁrm 1ʼs output x1 as given, maximizes the proﬁt p2(x1, x2)=x2P(x1+x2),C(x2)
with respect to the output x2. Firm 1, knowing ﬁrm 2ʼs reaction function j2(x1), maximizes the
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proﬁt p1(x1, j2(x1))=x1P(x1+j2(x1)),C(x1) with respect to the output x1.
6
Denote by xF2 and
xL1 the equilibrium output of the follower and that of the leader, respectively, where x
F
2=j2(x
L
1).
Denote by XS the total output in the Stackelberg duopoly equilibrium, where XS=xL1+x
F
2.
The ﬁrst-order condition for ﬁrm 2 to maximize p2 (x1, x2)= x2P (x1+ x2),C (x2) with
respect to x2, taking x1 as given, is given by
P(XS)+xF2P'(X
S),C'(xF2)=0. (5)
The ﬁrst-order condition for ﬁrm 1 to maximize p1(x1, j2(x1))=x1P(x1+j2(x1)),C(x1) with
respect to x1 is given by
P(XS)+xL1{1+j2'(x
L
1)}P'(X
S),C'(xL1)=0. (6)
Denote by pLi and p
F
i , i=1, 2, the proﬁt of the leader and that of the follower in the
Stackelberg duopoly equilibrium, respectively. Since all ﬁrms are identical and compete in the
same product market by hypothesis, we have xL1=x
L
2, x
F
1=x
F
2, p
L
1=p
L
2, and p
F
1=p
F
2 . So it will
suﬃce to explore ﬁrm 1ʼs side alone.
III. Comparison of the Two Duopoly Equilibria
Let us now compare equilibrium properties of the Cournot and Stackelberg duopoly with
respect to outputs, proﬁts, and welfare.
First, as for the results of comparison with respect to the equilibrium outputs and proﬁts,
we have the following proposition:
7
Proposition 1.
(a) In the case where ,1< j2 '<0 (that is, the followerʼs reaction function is downward
sloping and not so steep), xL1>x
C
1>x
F
1 and p
L
1>p
C
1>p
F
1.
(b) In the case where 0<j2'<1 (that is, the followerʼs reaction function is upward sloping and
not so steep), pF1>p
L
1>p
C
1 and x
C
1>x
F
1>x
L
1; in the case where j2'>1 (that is, the followerʼs
reaction function is upward sloping and so steep), pF1>p
L
1>p
C
1 and x
F
1>x
L
1>x
C
1 .
(c) In the case where j2 '<,1 (that is, the followerʼs reaction function is downward sloping
and so steep), xF1>x
C
1>x
L
1; p
C
1>p
F
1>p
L
1 if P(X
S),C'(x")>0 and pC1>p
L
1>p
F
1 otherwise,
where x"is a number between xL1 and x
F
1 such that C(x
L
1),C(x
F
1)=(x
L
1,x
F
1)C'(x").
Proof. See Appendix A1. ■
Intuition for the results in Proposition 1 can be explained as follows. As for Part (a),
which corresponds to the strategic-substitutes case (i.e., 2p2/x1x2<0), ﬁrm 1, by producing
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6 We can also consider the situation in which there exist one leader and n,1 (nB3) followers in the industry. The
followers cooperatively maximize the proﬁt p2 with respect to their ʻjointʼ output x2=Σ
n-1
i=1 x2i, taking the leaderʼs
output x1 as given. Immediately, p2(x1, x2)=x2P(x1+x2),C(x2)>∑
n-1
i=1 p2i(x1, x2i)=∑
n-1
i=1 {x2iP(x1+x2),C(x2i)} if and
only if C(∑n-1i=1 x2i)<∑
n-1
i=1 C(x2i), that is, the ʻjointʼ cost of production is smaller under cooperation than under non-
cooperation. The followersʼ reaction function j2 (x1) will be deﬁned as usual. The leader, knowing j2 (x1), non-
cooperatively maximizes the proﬁt p1(x1, j2(x1))=x1P(x1+j2(x1)),C(x1) with respect to x1.
7 Okuguchi (1999) had the same results as those in Part (a) and the ﬁrst case of Part (b) in Proposition 1, focusing
not on the elasticities e, h, m but on the slope of ﬁrm iʼs reaction function, i.e., the sign of j2'.
the output x1 more, forces ﬁrm 2 to gain the marginal proﬁt p2/x2 less and to produce the
output x2 less, which leads to x
L
1>x
C
1 and x
C
2>x
F
2 . Assuming gross substitutes (i.e., p i/xj=
xiP'<0 for i, j=1, 2, j4i), we have p
L
1>p
C
1 and p
C
2>p
F
2. As for Part (b), which corresponds
to the strategic-complements case (i.e., 2 p2 / x1  x2>0), in case 0<j2 '<1, ﬁrm 1, by
producing x1 less, forces ﬁrm 2 to gain the marginal proﬁt p2 /x2 less and to produce the
output x2 less, which leads to x
L
1<x
C
1 and x
C
2>x
F
2. Assuming gross substitutes, we have p
L
1>p
C
1
and pC2>p
F
2.
Note that the results of comparison in Part (c) are much diﬀerent from those in Part (a),
both of which correspond to the strategic-substitutes cases, in that whereas the output of the
leader is the largest in Part (a), it is the smallest in Part (c). This is because whereas the output
of the leader is larger than that of the follower if F-H-O condition is satisﬁed, this is not the
case if F-H-O condition is not satisﬁed. Likewise, as for Part (b), the results of comparison in
the second case are much diﬀerent from those in the ﬁrst case, both of which correspond to the
strategic-complements cases, in that whereas the output of the Cournot player is the largest in
the ﬁrst case, it is the smallest in the second case. This is because whereas the output of the
Cournot player is larger than that of the Stackelberg leader if the followerʼs reaction function is
not so steep, this is not the case if the followerʼs reaction function is so steep.
Deﬁne consumer surplus by G(X)=8X0P(Y)dY,P(X)X. Write G
S
=G(XS) and GC=G(XC).
Then we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2.
(a) In the case where ,1<j2 '<0, consumer surplus is smaller in the Cournot equilibrium
than in the Stackelberg equilibrium.
(b) In the case where 0<j2'<1, consumer surplus is larger in the Cournot equilibrium than in
the Stackelberg equilibrium; in the case where j2 '>1, consumer surplus is smaller in the
Cournot equilibrium than in the Stackelberg equilibrium.
(c) In the case where j2'<,1, consumer surplus is smaller in the Cournot equilibrium than in
the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A2. ■
Intuition for the results in Proposition 2 can be explained as follows. XS> (resp. <) XC
corresponds to P (XS)< (resp. >) P (XC), which corresponds to GS> (resp. <) GC . In other
words, the larger the total output in the industry, the lower the price of the good, and hence
consumer surplus is the larger.
Proposition 2 means that consumer surplus is smaller in the Cournot equilibrium than in
the Stackelberg equilibrium if the followerʼs reaction function is downward sloping or if the
followerʼs reaction function is upward sloping and so steep. On the contrary, consumer surplus
is larger in the Cournot equilibrium if the followerʼs reaction function is upward sloping and
not so steep.
Deﬁne producer surplus by P=p1+p2. Write P
S
=pL1+p
F
2=P(X
S)XS,{C(xL1)+C(x
F
2)}
and PC=pC1+p
C
2=P(X
C)XC,{C(xC1)+C(x
C
2)}. Then we have the following proposition:
Proposition 3.
(a) In the case where ,1<j2'<0 with hC,1/2 and mB0, producer surplus is larger in the
Cournot equilibrium than in the Stackelberg equilibrium.
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(b) In the case where j2 '>0, producer surplus is smaller in the Cournot equilibrium than in
the Stackelberg equilibrium.
(c) In the case where j2 '<,1 with hC,1/2, producer surplus is larger in the Cournot
equilibrium than in the Stackelberg equilibrium, provided that x+> x++, where x+ is a
number between xC1 and x
L
1 such that C(x
L
1),C(x
C
1)=(x
L
1,x
C
1)C'(x
+) and x++ is a number
between xC2 and x
F
2 such that C(x
C
2),C(x
F
2)=(x
C
2,x
F
2)C'(x
++).
Proof. See Appendix A3. ■
Proposition 3 means that producer surplus is larger in the Cournot equilibrium than in the
Stackelberg equilibrium if (1) the marginal revenue function is steeper than the demand
function, the marginal cost functions are non-decreasing, and the demand function is weakly
convex and less elastic. On the contrary, producer surplus is smaller in the Cournot equilibrium
if (2) the demand function is steeper than the marginal revenue function, the marginal cost
functions are non-decreasing, and the demand function is convex to some extent and less
elastic, if (3) the demand function is steeper than the marginal revenue function, the marginal
cost functions are decreasing, and the demand function is convex to some extent and elastic to
some extent, if (4) the marginal cost functions are steeper than the marginal revenue function,
the marginal cost functions are non-decreasing, and the demand function is strongly convex and
more elastic, or if (5) the marginal revenue function is steeper than the demand function, the
marginal cost functions are decreasing, and the demand function is weakly convex and elastic
to some extent, together with x+>x++.
Deﬁne total surplus by W=G+P. Write WS=GS+PS and WC=GC+PC. Then we have
the following proposition:
Proposition 4.
(a) In the case where ,1<j2'<0, total surplus is smaller in the Cournot equilibrium than in
the Stackelberg equilibrium if C"B0, j2(x
＊)>x＊, and ,1C,P'/(P',C")<j2', if C"<0,
j2(x
＊)<x＊, and ,P'/(P',C")<,1<j2', or if C"B0, j2(x
＊)>x＊, and ,1<j2'<,P'/
(P',C"), where x＊ is a number between xL1 and x
C
1 such that W (x
L
1) ,W (x
C
1) =
(xL1,x
C
1)W'(x
＊).
(b) In the case where 0<j2'<1, total surplus is larger in the Cournot equilibrium than in the
Stackelberg equilibrium if C"B0 and j2(x
＊)>x＊, or if C"<0 and j2(x
＊)<x＊; in the case
where j2 '>1, total surplus is smaller in the Cournot equilibrium than in the Stackelberg
equilibrium if C"B0 and j2(x
＊)>x＊, or if C"<0 and j2(x
＊)<x＊.
(c) In the case where j2'<,1, total surplus is larger in the Cournot equilibrium than in the
Stackelberg equilibrium if j2(x
＊)<x＊.
Proof. See Appendix A4. ■
Proposition 4 implies that, as long as the followerʼs reaction function is not so steep (i.e.,
|j2'|<1), the policy such that welfare is improved in behalf of consumers will be preferable.
That is, the policy such that the Stackelberg leader should be advantageous in the industry will
be preferable in case ,1<j2'<0, whereas the policy such that the Cournot player should be
advantageous in the industry will be preferable in case 0<j2'<1. On the contrary, as long as
the followerʼs reaction function is so steep (i.e., |j2 '|>1), the policy such that welfare is
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improved in behalf of producers will be preferable. That is, the policy such that the Stackelberg
follower should be advantageous in the industry will be preferable in case j2'>1 and in case
j2'<,1.
IV. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have compared equilibrium properties of Cournot and Stackelberg
duopoly with respect to outputs, proﬁts, and welfare, focusing on whether F-H-O condition is
satisﬁed or not, provided that the second-order condition for the optimum is still satisﬁed. The
analysis can be extended to a case with symmetric more-than-two ﬁrms. We have pointed out
that the results of comparison depend on some conditions expressed in terms of the elasticities
of the cost and demand functions. In particular, we have shown that the case where F-H-O
condition is not satisﬁed exactly corresponds to the case where the marginal revenue function is
steeper than the demand function, the marginal cost functions are decreasing, and the demand
function is elastic to some extent, the case of which gives rise to diﬀerent results from
Okuguchiʼs (1999).
We have derived conditions for a ﬁrst mover, a second mover, or a simultaneous mover to
be more advantageous than the others, those of which are expressed in terms of the elasticities
of the cost and demand functions. Conversely, given the Cournot and Stackelberg duopoly, will
the elasticities be estimated as those derived above? It is left to future studies to investigate this
problem.
APPENDIX
In this Appendix, we ﬁrst introduce several lemmas, which we use in turn to prove the propositions.
It follows from (2) that
1+j2'(x1)=(P',C")/{(P'+x2P")+(P',C")}>0 (resp. <0) as P',C"<0 (resp. >0). (A1)
It follows from (A1) and (6) that
P(XS),C'(xL1)=,x
L
1{1+j2'(x
L
1)}P'(X
S)>0 (resp. <0)
as 1+j2'(x
L
1)>0 (resp. <0), i.e., P',C"<0 (resp. >0).
(A2)
It follows from (5) that
P(XS),C'(xF1)=,x
F
1P'(X
S)>0. (A3)
It follows from (A2) and (A3) that
C'(xL1),C'(x
F
2)={(x
L
1,x
F
2)+x
L
1j2'(x
L
1)}P'(X
S). (A4)
As for the left-hand side of (A4), since by the Mean Value Theorem there is some number x' between xL1
and xF2 such that C'(x
L
1),C'(x
F
2)=(x
L
1,x
F
2)C"(x'), we obtain
(xL1,x
F
2){P'(X
S),C"(x')}=,xL1j2'(x
L
1)P'(X
S). (A5)
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Putting xF1=x
F
2 into (A5), we obtain
sign(xL1,x
F
1){P'(X
S),C"(x')}=sign{j2'(x
L
1)}. (A6)
In light of (A6), we have
(i) If P',C"<0, then xL1>x
F
1 (resp. x
L
1<x
F
1) as j2'<0 (resp. >0).
(ii) If P',C">0, then xL1<x
F
1 as j2'<0.
(A7)
By the Mean Value Theorem, we have xF2,x
C
2=j2(x
L
1),j2(x
C
1)=(x
L
1,x
C
1)j2'(x
0), where x0 is a number
between xL1 and x
C
1 . Hence
XS,XC=(xL1,x
C
1)+(x
F
2,x
C
2)=(x
L
1,x
C
1){1+j2'(x
0)}. (A8)
It follows that pL1,p
F
1=(x
L
1,x
F
1)P(X
S),{C(xL1),C(x
F
1)} and hence
pL1,p
F
1=(x
L
1,x
F
1){P(X
S),C'(x")}, (A9)
where x" is a number between xL1 and x
F
1 such that C(x
L
1),C(x
F
1)=(x
L
1,x
F
1)C'(x").
Consider Case (a) in Lemma 1. By the ﬁrst part of (A7), since ,1<j2'<0, we see that
xL1,x
C
1>x
F
1,x
C
1=x
F
2,x
C
2=j2(x
L
1),j2(x
C
1)=(x
L
1,x
C
1)j2'(x
0), (A10)
whence (xL1,x
C
1){1,j2'(x
0)}>0, which implies that xL1>x
C
1 . Hence x
F
1<x
C
1 by (A10). We see that
pF1=x
F
1P(x
L
1+x
F
2),C(x
F
1)
<xF1P(x
C
1+x
F
2),C(x
F
1) since x
L
1>x
C
1
<xF1P(x
F
1+x
C
2),C(x
C
1) since x
C
1=x
C
2 and x
F
1=x
F
2
(A11)
<xC1P(x
C
1+x
C
2),C(x
C
1)=p
C
1 ,
where the last inequality holds since x1P(x1+x
C
2),C(x1) has a maximum at x1=x
C
1 . In like manner,
pC1=x
C
1P(x
C
1+j2(x
C
1)),C(x
C
1)
<xC1P(x
C
1+j2(x
L
1)),C(x
C
1) since x
F
2=j2 (x
L
1)<j2(x
C
1) as x
L
1>x
C
1 (A12)
<xL1P(x
L
1+x
F
2),C(x
L
1)=p
L
1,
where the last inequality holds since x1P(x1+x
F
2),C(x1) has a maximum at x1=x
L
1 . If C"B0, then, since
xF1<x"<x
L
1 by the ﬁrst part of (A7), C'(x
F
1)CC'(x")CC'(x
L
1). Taking into account (A2), we obtain P(X
S)
,C'(x")BP(XS),C'(xL1)>0. Hence p
L
1>p
F
1 by (A9). On the other hand, if C"<0, then, since x
F
1<x"<x
L
1
by the ﬁrst part of (A7), C'(xL1)<C'(x")<C'(x
F
1). Taking into account (A3), we obtain P(X
S),C'(x")>
P(XS),C'(xF1)>0. Hence we have p
L
1>p
F
1 by (A9).
Consider Case (b) in Lemma 1. By the ﬁrst part of (A7), since j2'>0, we see that
xL1,x
C
1<x
F
1,x
C
1=x
F
2,x
C
2=j2(x
L
1),j2(x
C
1)=(x
L
1,x
C
1)j2'(x
0), (A13)
whence (xL1,x
C
1){1,j2'(x
0)}<0, which implies that xL1<x
C
1 if 0<j2'<1 and x
L
1>x
C
1 if j2'>1. Hence by
(A13), xF1<x
C
1 if 0<j2'<1 and x
F
1>x
C
1 if j2'>1. First, if 0<j2'<1, then we have
pC1=x
C
1P(x
C
1+x
C
2),C(x
C
1)
<xC1P(x
L
1+x
F
2),C(x
C
1) since x
L
1<x
C
1 and x
L
1+x
F
2=X
S
<XC=xC1+x
C
2 by (A8) (A14)
<xF1P(x
L
1+x
F
2),C(x
F
1)=p
F
1,
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where the last inequality holds since x1P(x1+x
F
2),C(x1) has a maximum at x1=x
F
1, and
pC1=x
C
1P(x
C
1+j2(x
C
1)),C(x
C
1)
<xC1P(x
C
1+j2(x
L
1)),C(x
C
1) since x
F
2=j2 (x
L
1)<j2(x
C
1) as x
L
1<x
C
1 (A15)
<xL1P(x
L
1+x
F
2),C(x
L
1)=p
L
1,
where the last inequality holds since x1P(x1+x
F
2),C(x1) has a maximum at x1=x
L
1 . If C"B0, then, since
xF1>x">x
L
1 by the ﬁrst part of (A7), C'(x
F
1)BC'(x")BC'(x
L
1). Taking into account (A3), we obtain P(X
S)
,C'(x")BP(XS),C'(xF1)>0. Hence p
L
1<p
F
1 by (A9). If C"<0, then, since x
F
1>x">x
L
1 by the ﬁrst part of
(A7), C' (xF1)<C' (x")<C' (x
L
1) . Taking into account (A2), we obtain P (X
S),C' (x")>P (XS),C' (xL1)>0.
Hence we have pL1<p
F
1 by (A9). Second, if j2'>1, then we have p
C
1<p
F
1, p
L
1<p
F
1, and p
C
1<p
L
1 in like
manner.
Consider Case (c) in Lemma 1. By the second part of (A7), since j2'<,1, we see that x
L
1,x
C
1<x
F
1
,xC1=x
F
2,x
C
2=j2(x
L
1),j2(x
C
1)=(x
L
1,x
C
1)j2'(x
0), and hence (xL1,x
C
1){1,j2'(x
0)}<0, which implies that
xL1<x
C
1 . Immediately, we have X
S
,XC=(xL1,x
C
1){1+j2'(x
0)}>0 by (A8) and xF1,x
C
1=(x
L
1,x
C
1)j2'(x
0)
>0. Then
pF1=x
F
1P(x
L
1+x
F
2),C(x
F
1)
<xF1P(x
C
1+x
C
2),C(x
F
1) since x
L
1+x
F
2=X
S
>XC=xC1+x
C
2 by (A8) (A16)
<xC1P(x
C
1+x
C
2),C(x
C
1)=p
C
1 ,
where the last inequality holds since x1P(x1+x
C
2),C(x1) has a maximum at x1=x
C
1 , and
pL1=x
L
1P(x
L
1+j2(x
L
1)),C(x
L
1)
<xL1P(x
L
1+j2(x
C
1)),C(x
L
1) since j2 (x
L
1)>j2(x
C
1)=x
C
2 as x
L
1<x
C
1 (A17)
<xC1P(x
C
1+x
C
2),C(x
C
1)=p
C
1 ,
where the last inequality holds since x1P(x1+x
C
2),C(x1) has a maximum at x1=x
C
1 . Since C"<0 and x
L
1
<x"<xF1 by the second part of (A7), C' (x
L
1)>C' (x")>C' (x
F
1) . Taking into account (A2) and (A3), we
obtain P(XS),C'(xF1)>P(X
S),C'(x")>P(XS),C'(xL1), where P(X
S),C'(xF1)>0 and P(X
S),C'(xL1)<0.
Hence by (A9), we have pL1<p
F
1 if P(X
S),C'(x")>0 and pL1>p
F
1 if P(X
S),C'(x")<0.
In summary, we have the following result:
Lemma 2.
(a) In Case (a) in Lemma 1, xL1>x
C
1>x
F
1 and p
L
1>p
C
1>p
F
1.
(b) In Case (b) in Lemma 1, pF1>p
L
1>p
C
1 ; x
C
1>x
F
1>x
L
1 if 0<j2'<1 and x
F
1>x
L
1>x
C
1 if j2'>1.
(c) In Case (c) in Lemma 1, xF1>x
C
1>x
L
1; p
C
1>p
F
1>p
L
1 if P(X
S),C'(x")>0 and pC1>p
L
1>p
F
1 otherwise,
where x" is a number between xL1 and x
F
1 such that C(x
L
1),C(x
F
1)=(x
L
1,x
F
1)C'(x").
We have the following lemma:
Lemma 3.
(a) In Case (a) in Lemma 1, XS>XC.
(b) In Case (b) in Lemma 1, XS<XC if 0<j2'<1 and X
S
>XC if j2'>1.
(c) In Case (c) in Lemma 1, XS>XC.
Proof. Remember that ,1<j2 '<0, j2 '>0, and j2 '<,1 in Case (a), Case (b), and Case (c) in
Lemma 1, respectively. Then the proof is immediate by (A8) and Lemma 2. ■
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A1. Proof of Proposition 1 The proof is immediate from Lemma 2 since ,1<j2 '<0, j2 '>0, and
j2'<,1 in Case (a), Case (b), and Case (c) in Lemma 1, respectively. ■
A2. Proof of Proposition 2 By the integral by parts we have G (X)= 8X0 {,YP' (Y)} dY>0. Note that
{G(X)}'=,XP'>0. As for Part (a), since XS>XC by Lemma 3, ,XSP'(XS)>,XCP'(XC). Hence GS=
G(XS)>G(XC)=GC. As for Part (b), XS<XC if 0<j2'<1 and X
S
>XC if j2'>1 by Lemma 3. Hence G
S
<
GC if 0<j2'<1 and G
S
>GC if j2'>1. As for Part (c), since X
S
>XC by Lemma 3, ,XSP'(XS)>,XCP'
(XC). Hence GS>GC, as desired. ■
A3. Proof of Proposition 3 It follows that PS,PC=(pL1,p
C
1)+(p
F
2,p
C
2), where, by way of the Mean
Value Theorem,
pL1,p
C
1=P(X
S)xL1,P(X
C)xC1,{C(x
L
1),C(x
C
1)}
=(xL1,x
C
1){P(X
S),C'(x+)}+xC1{P(X
S),P(XC)},
where x+ is a number between xL1 and x
C
1 such that C(x
L
1),C(x
C
1)=(x
L
1,x
C
1)C'(x
+), and
pF2,p
C
2=P(X
S)xF2,P(X
C)xC2,{C(x
F
2),C(x
C
2)}
=(xF2,x
C
2){P(X
S),C'(x++)}+xC2{P(X
S),P(XC)}
=(xL1,x
C
1)j2'(x
0){P(XS),C'(x++)}+xC2{P(X
S),P(XC)},
where x++ is a number between xF2 and x
C
2 such that C(x
F
2),C(x
C
2)=(x
F
2,x
C
2)C'(x
++). By using P(XS),
P(XC)=(XS,XC)P'(X0), where X0 is a number between XS and XC, together with XS,XC=(xL1,x
C
1){1+
j2'(x
0)}, we have
PS,PC=(xL1,x
C
1)[P(X
S),C'(x+)+XCP'(X0)+j2'(x
0){P(XS),C'(x++)+XCP'(X0)}]. (A18)
Remind that concerning the slope of the followerʼs reaction function, ,1<j2'<0 in Part (a), j2'>0
in Part (b), and j2'<,1 in Part (c) in Proposition 1.
As for Part (a) in Proposition 3, ﬁrst note that xL1>x
C
1 , and hence X
S
>X0 (>XC) by Lemma 3. If
C"B0 (i.e., mB0) then, since xF1<x
++ and hence C'(xF1)CC'(x
++), we obtain
P(XS),C'(x++)+XCP'(X0)
CP(XS),C'(xF1)+X
CP'(X0)=,xF1P'(X
S)+XCP'(X0) (by (A3))
<,xF1P'(X
S)+XCP'(XS) if P">0 (i.e., hC,1/2)
={(xC1,x
F
1)+x
C
2}P'(X
S)<0.
Therefore, since C"B0, j2'>,1, and x
+
>x++, we obtain
P(XS),C'(x+)+XCP'(X0)+j2'(x
0){P(XS),C'(x++)+XCP'(X0)}
<P(XS),C'(x+)+XCP'(X0),{P(XS),C'(x++)+XCP'(X0)}=C'(x++),C'(x+)<0.
Hence PS<PC by (A18).
As for Part (b), the proof is immediate from Proposition 1: PS=pL1+p
F
2>P
C
=pC1+p
C
2 .
As for Part (c), ﬁrst note that xL1<x
C
1 , and hence X
S
>X0 (>XC). Since C"<0 (i.e., m<0), xL1<x
++,
and C'(xL1)>C'(x
++), we obtain
P(XS),C'(x++)+XCP'(X0)
<P(XS),C'(xL1)+X
CP'(X0)=,xL1{1+j2'(x
L
1)}P'(X
S)+XCP'(X0) (by (A2))
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<,xL1{1+j2'(x
L
1)}P'(X
S)+XCP'(XS) if P">0 (i.e., hC,1/2)
={(xC1,x
L
1)+x
C
2,x
L
1j2'(x
L
1)}P'(X
S)<0.
Therefore, if x+>x++ then, since C"<0 and j2'<,1, we obtain
P(XS),C'(x+)+XCP'(X0)+j2'(x
0){P(XS),C'(x++)+XCP'(X0)}
>P(XS),C'(x+)+XCP'(X0),{P(XS),C'(x++)+XCP'(X0)}=C'(x++),C'(x+)>0.
Hence PS<PC by (A18). This completes the proof of the proposition. ■
A4. Proof of Proposition 4 We can write total surplus as W(x1)=8X0P(Y)dY,C(x1),C(j2(x1)), where X=
x1+j2(x1). It follows by the Mean Value Theorem that
W(xL1),W(x
C
1)=(x
L
1,x
C
1)W'(x
＊), (A19)
where x＊ is a number between xL1 and x
C
1 and
W'(x1)=j2'(x1){P(X),C'(j2(x1))}+{P(X),C'(x1)}.
Note that
{P(x1+j2(x1)),C'(j2(x1))}'=j2'(P',C")+P'>0 (resp. <0)
as (i) j2'<(resp. >) ,P'/(P',C") if P',C"<0,
or (ii) j2'>(resp. <) ,P'/(P',C") if P',C">0,
,P'/(P',C")B(resp. <) ,1 as C"B0 (resp. <0) if P',C"<0,
,P'/(P',C")>0 if P',C">0.
As for Part (a), ﬁrst note that P',C"<0 and xC1<x
＊
<xL1 . If C"B0 and ,1C,P'/(P',C")<j2',
then {P(.),C'(.)} '<0, whence P(x＊+j2(x
＊)),C'(j2(x
＊))>P(xL1+j2(x
L
1)),C'(j2(x
L
1))>0 by (A3).
Then we see that
W'(x＊)=j2'(x
＊){P(x＊+j2(x
＊)),C'(j2(x
＊))}+{P(x＊+j2(x
＊)),C'(x＊)}
>,{P(x＊+j2(x
＊)),C'(j2(x
＊))}+{P(x＊+j2(x
＊)),C'(x＊)}=C'(j2(x
＊)),C'(x＊),
the last inequality of which is>0 if j2(x
＊)>x＊. On the other hand, if C"<0 and ,P'/(P',C")<,1<
j2', then {P(.),C'(.)}'<0, whence P(x
＊
+j2(x
＊)),C'(j2(x
＊))>P(xL1+j2(x
L
1)),C'(j2(x
L
1))>0 by (A3).
Then we see that
W'(x＊)=j2'(x
＊){P(x＊+j2(x
＊)),C'(j2(x
＊))}+{P(x＊+j2(x
＊)),C'(x＊)}
>,{P(x＊+j2(x
＊)),C'(j2(x
＊))}+{P(x＊+j2(x
＊)),C'(x＊)}=C'(j2(x
＊)),C'(x＊),
the last inequality of which is>0 if j2(x
＊)<x＊. If C"B0 and ,1<j2 '<,P'/(P',C"), then {P(.),
C'(.)}'>0, whence P(x＊+j2(x
＊)),C'(j2(x
＊))>P(xC1+j2(x
C
1)),C'(j2(x
C
1))>0 by (1). Then we see that
W'(x＊)=j2'(x
＊){P(x＊+j2(x
＊)),C'(j2(x
＊))}+{P(x＊+j2(x
＊)),C'(x＊)}
>,{P(x＊+j2(x
＊)),C'(j2(x
＊))}+{P(x＊+j2(x
＊)),C'(x＊)}=C'(j2(x
＊)),C'(x＊),
the last inequality of which is>0 if j2(x
＊)>x＊. In those three cases, we have WS=W(xL1)>W(x
C
1)=W
C
by (A19).
In like manner, as for Part (b), we have WS<WC in case 0<j2'<1 and W
S
>WC in case j2'>1 by
(A19) if C"B0, P',C"<0, and j2(x
＊)>x＊, or if C"<0, P',C"<0, and j2(x
＊)<x＊; as for Part (c), we
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have WS<WC by (A19) if j2(x
＊)<x＊. This completes the proof of the proposition. ■
Remark. It follows by the Mean Value Theorem that j2(x),x=j2(0)+x{j2'(x
#),1}, where 0<x#<x.
Hence j2(x
＊)>(resp. <) x＊ as j2'(x
#)>(resp. <) 1+{P(j2(0)),C'(j2(0))}/x
＊P'(j2(0)). For example,
we have j2(x
＊)>x＊ if j2'>1 and j2(x
＊)<x＊ if j2'<1 with x
＊ suﬃciently large.
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